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Abstract 
This paper studies how to design a fiscal constitution that protects future generations from expropriation and generates 
optimal investment in intergenerational public goods. We study how to accomplish these goals by changing the level of 
government to which different types of intergenerational public goods are assigned, and the tax base of the different 
jurisdictions. We show that land taxation is the essential instrument for policies that mostly generate fiscal spillovers, 
such as debt and public infrastructure. By contrast, interjurisdictional competition is required for policies that mostly 
generate direct spillovers, such as irreversible environmental damages. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to 
design a fiscal constitution that generates full capitalization of fiscal spillovers, but in general, not one that generates 
full capitalization of direct spillovers.
Published as a working paper in NBER Working Paper No. W8394 Issued in July 2001
Paper is available at URL: http://papers.nber.org/papers/W8394
(Fax)
 
Citation: John Conley and Antonio Rangel, (2001) ''Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land 
Taxes and Federalism'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 28 no.17 p.A1. 
Submitted: August 03, 2001  Published: August 03, 2001. 
URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume28/EB-01AA0021A.pdf 
 
     